A few remarks on the mechanisms of censorship in the PRL and the Third Republic of Poland by Dąbrowski, Jakub
A C T A  U N I V E R S I T A T I S  L O D Z I E N S I S
FOLIA LITTERARIA POLONICA 7(45) 2017
http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1505-9057.45.11
Jakub Dąbrowski*
A few remarks on the mechanisms of censorship  
in the PRL1 and the Third Republic of Poland
On 6 June 1990, an act which terminated the Chief Control Bureau for Press, 
Publications and Performances (hereinafter GUKPPiW) came into force.2 One 
could say that it symbolically marked the final act in the dismantling of the to-
talitarian system, yet in society’s eyes it has never acquired the status of an event 
which deserves commemorating during state anniversary celebrations, confer-
ences, or symposia. It seems prudent to shortly discuss the reasons for that as 
I am of the opinion that they are connected with another important issue: I believe 
that the termination of GUKPPiW was not some radical rupture; I would rather 
propose that certain mechanisms of censorship (i.e. the complex system of factors 
influencing social communication) have continued to exist.
It seems that the dissolving of GUKPPiW did not make any considerable 
impression on the minds of Poles due to several reasons. First of all, it occurred at 
a time when, due to faits accomplis, the Bureau and its district branches had lost 
almost any control over social communication. Basically since the Round Table 
Talks (6 Feb – 4 Apr 1989), there had been a rapid and spontaneous bottom-up 
rebellion against institutional censorship: books, magazines, leaflets, and posters 
were independently printed and distributed regardless of the formal supervision 
of GUKPPiW; the distribution of VHS cassettes and the organisation of perfor-
mances was also becoming uncontrolled. A significant factor in that process was 
the legalisation in late-1988 of private business activity.3 Also the attitudes of 
officials were inconsistent; some tried continuing their supervisory tasks, others – 
aware of the fact that their role had ended – only pretended to be performing their 
duties; that was the case, e.g. with Dariusz Fikus’s book entitled Foksal 81, when 
 * Dr, e-mail: jakub.dabrowski@cybis.asp.waw.pl, Faculty of management of Visual Culture, 
Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw, 00-379 Warsaw, 37/39 Wybrzeże Kościuszkowskie street.
 1 Commonly used abbreviation of the People’s Republic of Poland.
 2 Act of 11 April 1990 on the repealing of the act on the control of publications and performances, 
removing the units of the control and on the change of the Press Law act (J. of L. of 7 may 1990).
 3 more on the activities of GUKPPiW and its district branches in 1989–1990, vide K Kamiń-
ska, “Koniec cenzury w PRL (1989–1990)”, Studia Medioznawcze 2014, issue 3(58), pp. 113–132.
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in September 1989 Poznan censors tried to introduce as few changes as possible, 
and transfer the supervisory tasks onto law enforcement authorities, somewhat 
converting preventive censorship to – only potential by then – repressive cen-
sorship.4 The confusion intensified even further due to the policy of Tadeusz 
mazowiecki’s government, which formed on 12 September 1989, and which kept 
delaying the termination of GUKPPiW. Officially mazowiecki’s cabinet feared 
anti-Soviet provocations, yet retaining institutional supervision over the press, 
radio and television certainly facilitated the control of a country which was torn 
by a considerable crisis. At the same time, the statements of Deputy Secretary of 
State Jerzy Ciemniewski from January 1990 indicated that the years of captiv-
ity had twisted society’s understanding of how in a democracy the social sphere 
should operate.5
At this point the second issue becomes evident, i.e. the special perception of 
the issue of freedom of speech in Poland. It seems that even the left and liberal 
post-Solidarity elite (i.e., theoretically, the most open people) considered (and, to 
some extent, continue to consider) freedom of expression as something of second-
ary importance, which is strictly regulated through the so-called harm principle, 
and which is severable. I shall discuss both issues briefly. According to its classi-
cal liberal understanding, the harm principle means that any freedom ought to be 
limited by the state if the use thereof violates justifiable interests of other entities. 
However, in contemporary liberal democracies, a preferential treatment of the 
harm principle is considered problematic; also bear in mind that for it to function, 
it is necessary to define what is considered harmful, what those justifiable inter-
ests might be, and what constitutes the basis for defining them.6 In Poland, due 
 4 Z. Bosacki, “Nowa rola cenzury”, Gazeta Wyborcza 21.09.1989.
 5 On 29 may 1989, based on the Round Table agreements, the authorities restored the more 
lenient version of the Publications and Performances Act of 31 July 1981 (J. of L. of 1981 No. 20 
Item 99, and J. of L. of 1989 No. 34 Item 189). Ciemniewski presented on behalf of the government 
the planned changes to the act in force. Based on the project, upon printing the first two copies of 
a magazine, the publisher would be supposed to deliver them to the prosecutor’s office, which in 
turn could suspend its distribution, and refer the matter to the court within 12 hours. Ciemniews-
ki justified that solution with the need to “protect the state against press crimes” (L. Falandysz, 
“Prokurator cenzorem”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 22.01.1990). In doing so, he referred to the invasive 
pre-WWII press law, i.e. a solution typical of authoritarian systems of power.
 6 In liberal theories it is stressed that increased protection of freedom of expression is nec-
essary for the proper functioning of democracy and self-governance – in a democratic state, it 
is the citizens who should possess full access to information which could influence the choices 
made within the process of collective decision-making (the so-called notion of democratic self-
governance). At the same time, researchers indicate that in democratic societies, the level of that 
protection in relation to public matters ought to be increased (while the harm principle ought to 
be “suspended”) when compared to, e.g. the level of protection of statements leading to “private” 
defamation. Vide W. Sadurski, “Prawo do wolności słowa w państwie demokratycznym (zagad-
nienia teoretyczne)”, Państwo i Prawo 1992, issue 10, p. 8.
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to historical reasons, the social and political understanding of reality has been for 
many centuries subjected to binary pressures, totalitising relations, if you will, 
e.g. the nation – partitioning powers, freedom – totalitarianism, the people – the 
state apparatus, Polish Catholicism – the Others, duties regarding the motherland 
– detached aesthetism, collective good – the individual. That is why the features 
of the dominant attitude include attachment to grand narratives, Catholic values, 
historic myths, and strong identities, which must be defended at all cost. What 
is missing is a post-Enlightenment democratic tradition for which that which is 
constructive are pluralistic social divisions, antagonisms, critical thinking, and 
debating pre-established templates of one’s existence7
The results can be found in, e.g. law, and art. One could say that in relation 
to the judicial regulations of freedom of speech, the 1990 division line is mainly 
symbolic because what is important is which actual values have filled the notion 
of liberal democracy grafted from the West, with its human rights guaranteed in 
a constitution, and specific legal solutions (therefore, the law is understood not 
as an independent regulator of social relations, but rather as a product of those, 
strengthening them in return). The number of regulations in the penal code (here-
inafter k.k.) which normalise the area of discourse is considerable (e.g. Art. 133, 
Art. 135(2), 137, 196, 202, 212, 216, 226, 256, 257), some of which possess PRL 
provenance, while many of which are considered by law scholars as controversial, 
and remain contrary to the case-law of the European Court for Human Rights in 
Strasbourg (ECHR).8 Polish lawmakers seem to value esteem, including the es-
teem of state officials, religious beliefs, and state symbols more than the free flow 
of ideas. The judgements of the Constitutional Tribunal (hereinafter TK) rather 
seem to confirm those conservative tendencies.9 Similar phenomena of mutatis 
 7 more on the problems of Polish modernity, vide, e.g. J. Sowa, Inna Rzeczpospolita jest moż-
liwa. Widma przeszłości, wizje przyszłości, Wydawnictwo: W.A.B., Warsaw 2015; P. Czapliński, 
Resztki nowoczesności, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Krakow 2011.
 8 A criticism of the regulations limiting freedom of expression within the penal code, vide, 
e.g.: W. mojski, “Prawnokarne ograniczenia wolności wypowiedzi w polskim porządku praw-
nym. Analiza wybranych przepisów”, Studia Iuridica Lublinensia 2009, issue 12, pp. 177–196; 
W. Sadurski, “Wolność prasy w systemie praw człowieka (Wybrane zagadnienia)”, in: Obywatel 
– jego wolności i prawa. Zbiór studiów przygotowanych z okazji 10-lecia urzędu Rzecznika Praw 
Obywatelskich, Biuro Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich, Warsaw 1998, pp. 133–156. In ECHR case-
law it has been stressed that, e.g. the dignity of politicians ought to be protected less rigorously 
than the dignity of ordinary citizens (vide, e.g. Lingens vs. Slovakia, judgment of 8 July 1986, 
petition 9815/82; Castellas vs. Spain, judgment of 23 April 1992, petition 11798/85; Colombani 
vs. France, judgment of 25 June 2002, petition 51279/99), while in Poland the feudal tradition of 
increased protection of the personal rights of state officials has been maintained.
 9 Vide, e.g. judgments of TK: of 30 October 2006, file ref. no. P10/06 confirming the consti-
tutional compliance of Art. 212(1) and (2) of k.k.; of 6 July 2011, file ref. no. P12/09 confirming 
the constitutional compliance of Art. 135(2) of k.k., and of 6 October 2016, file ref. no. SK 54/13 
conforming the constitutional compliance of Art. 196 of k.k. The attitude of Poles to post-Enlight-
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mutandis can be identified in the area of art. Polish artistic traditions clearly lack 
any emphatic critical, contestation, or transgression streams. When after 1989 
there occurred a natural erosion of the homogeneous division according to two 
narratives: of the communist state, and the patriotic-independence movement, 
some artists tried shaking off the pathetic atmosphere of the 1980s, and began 
contesting that which in life and art was commonly considered natural: neutral, 
irrefutable, and obvious. That led to ideological conflicts, or even cultural wars, in 
which the left-liberal elite supported traditional values; instead of protecting the 
right to artistic provocation, they moralised, or, in more emphatic instances, they 
condemned and invalidated specific artistic projects.10 At the same time, there is 
a visible diversification of evaluations depending on the type of media and of art, 
which might indicate a special kind of severability of the notion of freedom. One 
could even talk about a special paragone, i.e. a comparison defining the hierarchy 
of the importance of arts. A position within the paragone translates into accept-
ance or rejection of possible transgressions; the more a given area is valued, the 
higher the acceptance of a violation, and vice versa.11 Art historians stress that 
when compared to literature, theatre, music, and film, visual arts in Poland have 
never been highly esteemed. As noted by Piotr Piotrowski, an art historian: within 
critical reflection and media discourse, they were rather condemned to maintain-
ing the traditions of Grand Topics à la Jan matejko, or modernist values with first 
and foremost the autonomy of the form12.
enment notions of liberal democracy, and a democratic state under the rule of law is yet another 
issue. The events following the elections in 2015 have indicated that they do not consider them as 
bearing fundamental significance.
 10 Evidence for that is offered by the articles published in the left-liberal Gazeta Wyborcza 
daily, particularly those published in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st. c.; more on that and 
on cultural wars, vide J. Dąbrowski, Cenzura w sztuce polskiej po 1989 roku, vol. 2 Artyści, sztuka 
i polityka, Fundacja Kultura miejsca, Warsaw 2014.
 11 A good example are the disquisitions of Fr. Andrzej Draguła, who compared Krystyna 
Janda’s play entitled Porozmawiajmy o życiu i śmierci to Pasja by Dorota Nieznalska (Bluźnier-
stwo. Między grzechem a przestępstwem, Towarzystwo „Więź”, Warsaw 2013 pp. 99–102). A pole-
mic with his views: J. Dąbrowski, “Recenzja książki Andrzeja Draguły: ‘Bluźnierstwo. Między 
grzechem a przestępstwem’”, Studia Litteraria Historica 2014/2015, issue 3/4, pp. 42–53.
 12 Piotr Piotrowski often emphasised the feebleness of the traditions of the Enlightenment in Po-
land, cultural conservatism, the lack of Dada traditions, and the inferior position of visual arts ex-
cluding 19th-century historical paintings, vide, e.g. P. Piotrowski, “Pazurami i dziobem w obronie 
demokracji”, Artmix 20.03.2007, http://www.obieg.pl/artmix/1729; idem, Znaczenia modernizmu. 
W stronę historii sztuki polskiej po 1945 roku, Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, Poznan 1999, p. 222 etc.; 
idem, Agorafilia. Sztuka i demokracja w postkumunistycznej Europie, Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, 
Poznan 2010, pp. 263–287; idem, Sztuka według polityki. Od Melancholii do Pasji, Universitas, Poznan 
2007, pp. 149–150, 204, 214–217, 227–244. The inferior position of plastic arts in Poland is historically 
rooted, and has been stressed since the 16th c. by Łukasz Górnicki (the famous passage: “Poles won’t 
find art nor any discussion of it useful”), more on the subject, vide also: J. Klaczko, Sztuka polska, 
[s.n.], Paris 1858; K. Pomian, “W błysku reklam, w świetle laserów”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 20.03.2004.
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Yet the spontaneous decomposition of institutional censorship, and a rather 
thoughtless acceptance by the society and its elite of the assumption that the formal 
termination of GUKPPiW was not only a necessary, but also a sufficient condition 
to ensure the democratic standards of freedom of the flow of ideas, constitute only 
a part of the issue in which I am interested. Within the juridical and symbolic di-
mensions, the change was, of course, significant. No longer was anyone required to 
submit their material to formal verification prior to its distribution, yet did that re-
ally mean a leap from captivity to freedom? To answer that question one should not 
only consider that which is obvious, i.e. what the changes that occurred were, but 
also approach the problem in reverse (as if in Foucault’s renversment), and study 
that which remained. I have already mentioned the long history of the dispersed 
power relations which for decades or even centuries have been shaping society’s 
view of the world, and, at the same time, which have informally defined the limits 
of freedom of expression. They emerged fully, and became analysable only after 
1989 as in the People’s Republic the problems of state power and freedom were 
mainly considered in relation to the abuses of the totalitarian state. The constancy 
of certain mechanisms which shaped social communication would be similarly 
significant in the discussed context. In other words, let us ask whether in the dis-
coursive reality within which GUKPPiW existed, and in the discoursive reality 
without the Bureau, there were any points where those two intersected.
In every society, in every political system, there always exist forces and mech-
anisms which in a more or less formal way, in a precedent or subsequent manner 
exclude from the public sphere certain types of expression. The rather common 
conviction that in the PRL there existed a struggle between society (mainly jour-
nalists, scholars, and artists) and state officials who at the censors’ HQ in mysia 
St. cut out from their texts and works of literature improper fragments is a myth. 
Communist censorship was not, as we have grown to perceive it, a case-based 
preventive control of the flow of ideas but a complex and continuous system of re-
lations which shaped desired social actions.13 Social communication was entwined 
in a network of relations within which all interested parties were responsible for 
the final shape of a message, and, at the same time, everyone monitored everyone 
else – starting with the moscow-dependant PZPR’s top echelon14, through authors, 
printers, distributors, vendors, and ending with GUKPPiW and its district branch 
 13 more on the subject, vide, e.g. Z. Romek, “System cenzury w PRL” and T. Strzyżewski, 
“Wstęp”, in: T. Strzyżewski, Wielka Księga Cenzury PRL w dokumentach, Prohibita, Warsaw 
2015, pp. 9–56; m. Łętowski, Gdy lżyliśmy ustrój i godziliśmy w sojusz…, Wydawnictwo KUL, 
Lublin 2010, pp. 41–46; B. Gogol, Fabryka fałszywych tekstów. Z działalności Wojewódzkiego 
Urzędu Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk w Gdańsku w latach 1945–1958, Neriton, Warsaw 
2012, pp. 44–50.
 14 PZPR – Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (The Polish United Workers’ Party) was the 
communist, totalitarian party which governed Poland from 1948 to 1989.
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offices. PZPR’s leaders were responsible for the coherence of the message; party 
secretaries were to be consulted by censors when the latter were not certain how to 
act in a specific case. According to the press law, any and all pieces of information 
were subject to the special “truth clause”, i.e. one could utilise freedom of speech 
but only when it led to a true presentation of phenomena while ensuring the fulfil-
ment of the interests of society and the socialist state, and the information to be 
provided was supposed to strengthen the constitutional system of the PRL.15 The 
provisions of the press law stipulated criminal liability for publishing unpermit-
ted press releases or not registering copying equipment, evading the obligation to 
submit a publication for verification, and non-observance of any bans on its distri-
bution. Criticism of the system was allowed, but only if it was, as the slogan went, 
constructive and responsible, i.e. resulting from one’s care for the People’s state, 
not a desire to condemn it. That limited permissivism was dictated by specific 
political goals, sometimes forced by domestic social and political tensions. Even 
censors conducting preventative control of the flow of ideas were verified within 
the repressive system, i.e. published material they had approved was verified on an 
on-going basis, which was called secondary censorship. The so-called oversights 
could influence their status at work, and, in extreme cases, could result in criminal 
liability. At the same time, the term censorship was meticulously hidden from 
sight. Any reference to it was absent from the name of GUKPPiW, while its em-
ployees were referred to as counsellors. Some censorship duties were distributed 
among other offices and institutions which were not associated with censorship, 
e.g. the Customs Office, the Chief management of Publishing Houses (Naczelny 
Zarząd Wydawnictw), or the Chief Council of Television Film Programmes (Nac-
zelna Rada Programów Filmowych Telewizji).16
The work system of GUKPPiW’s counsellors was carefully developed and 
discreet. According to the guidelines, the interventions were supposed to be as 
minor and rare as possible, yet directing the meaning of a text towards the desired 
direction. Strzyżewski emphasised that the number of those had been gradually 
falling since the 1960s. Within the 19 months spent at the Krakow branch of 
GUKPPiW, he intervened 8–10 times in press releases, and his interventions con-
sisted of removing fragments related to economic or military secrets (e.g. the pro-
duction capacity of industrial plants).17 Though no extensive research in the topic 
exists, a similar phenomenon could also be identified in the visual arts. The letters 
 15 Vide, e.g. Art. 1 of the Press Law Act of 26 January 1984 (J. of L. 1984 No. 5 Item 24): “Press 
shall utilise […] freedom of speech and print, […] strengthen the constitutional political system of 
the People’s Republic of Poland, in particular: shall disseminate information and express opinions 
in support of socialist social relations […] Art. 6(1) […] Press […] aims to deliver a true presentation 
of the phenomena being discussed observing the interests of the society, and the socialist state […]”.
 16 more on the subject Z. Romek, System…
 17 T. Strzyżewski, op. cit.
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exchanged between the management of Bunkier Sztuki Gallery in Krakow and 
the local branch of GUKPPiW (1977–1990 period) regarding permits for organis-
ing exhibitions, prints of invitations and posters, and catalogue texts retained in 
the archive of Bunkier Sztuki do not include any traces of censorship interven-
tions, not to mention any instances of challenging entire texts or exhibition ide-
as.18 That was a result of the strategy utilised in the communist system of control 
of the flow of ideas and thoughts which, according to Zbigniew Romek, was based 
on the so-called delegation of censorship duties.19 In other words, the intention 
was to make sure that counsellors received only material which did not require 
any corrections. Therefore, they made sure to cooperate with institutions and dis-
cuss in time with appropriate people what was and what was not allowed. What is 
significant, though, is that the actions of counsellors were the final, but not neces-
sarily the most important, element of the operations of the system of censorship. 
The stick was one method, while the carrot was the other: interesting, prestigious 
and lucrative positions, access to sources of financing, permits and concessions 
for specific activities, access to supplies from state-owned monopolies, and for-
eign trips were reserved for those who displayed potential for cooperation with 
the authorities.20 Stanisław Barańczak thus described the situation: “it is common 
for literature to subdue and gag itself. A peculiar sight: a victim putting the gag 
into his own mouth even though it appears as if no one forced him to do it. That 
image only becomes clear if one knows that the seemingly voluntary act results 
from a compulsion more complicated than pure physical violence, compulsion 
which utilises fear, pusillanimity, the desire to further one’s career or gain privi-
leges, or simply the necessity to earn money. The whole system of terror, lures, 
deceptions, and sophistic rationalisations ensures that a writer gags himself.”21 
 18 I wish to thank magdalena Ziółkowska, the manager of Bunkier Sztuki Gallery in Krakow, 
for granting me access to the institution’s archive.
 19 Z. Romek, System… Romek stressed that “the surviving censorship files […] indicate that 
the Bureau fulfilled its task of ‘delegating censorship duties’ well. There are few deletions present 
in surviving typescripts, and where there are some, they are minor corrections.” Idem, Cenzura 
a nauka historyczna w Polsce 1944–1970, Wydawnictwo Neriton – Instytut Historii PAN, Warsaw 
2010, p. 70. [English version translated from Polish].
 20 Zbigniew Romek described a situation from 1965 when the Central Committee of PZPR 
expressed its discontent with “the Chief Editorial Office [of the State Academic Publishing House 
– note by JD] not securing a completely appropriate academic policy of our party in the publishing 
house.” As a result, editorial teams and the heads of the publishing house’s divisions were replaced 
with people who ensured the desired ideological direction. Research in the West was available only 
to those who not only met factual criteria, but also political requirements defined by the party: 
Cenzura…, pp. 69, 94–103. The informal extra-legal pressure (mainly of an economic nature) 
exerted by communists on journalists, artists, directors, scholars, etc., and the related moral dilem-
mas are the leitmotif of Leopold Tyrmand’s Dziennik 1954.
 21 S. Barańczak, Knebel i słowo. O literaturze krajowej w latach siedemdziesiątych, Niezależna 
Oficyna Wydawnicza NOWA, Warsaw 1980, pp. 2–3. [English version translated from Polish].
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Barańczak described the situation which existed among writers, yet the problem 
of conformity was also stressed by Polish art historians: from the 1980s visual art-
ists, basically passive towards to the regime, were tamed by it. Exhibitions, sym-
posia, en plein air, allotment of workshops, positions at universities, special shops 
with art supplies, and the ability to exhibit or even sell works abroad sufficed to 
subdue the Polish art world. After the thaw period and the rejection of the doc-
trine of Socialist realism (1956), the authorities allowed plastic artists to engage 
in formal experiments as long as their works did not raise political issues. Artists 
could, of course, justify to themselves the choice of the modernist autonomy of 
form as a rebellious attitude traversing the ideologised reality, but that “rebellion” 
was, in reality, used by communists to consolidate and increase the credibility 
of the regime; it was supposed to prove the modern, open and westernist nature of 
the post-totalitarian state.22
Therefore, institutional censorship only ensured the coordination of the co-
herence of messages produced by self-censoring culture outlets: representatives 
of the media, scholars, writers, and artists. One could say that the most important 
feature of communist censorship was the principle stating that “good censorship 
is one which cannot be seen” (or in a more emphatic version: “is no longer nec-
essary”). That applied not only to hiding the existence of institutional control 
from society, but most of all to delegating censorship duties, which resulted in, as 
michel Foucault could have said, culture outlets’ self-gagging (assujetissement).23 
The authorities applied that principle through establishing and maintaining co-
 22 One indication of the passivity of the plastic arts community could be the protests against 
the changes to the Constitution of the PRL planned by Edward Gierek in 1975. When compared 
to the engagement of the literary and academic communities, what was puzzling was the lack of 
any anti-communist acts devised by plastic artists, as well as a lack of their support for existing 
initiatives. The so-called Letter of 59 submitted to the Sejm on 5 December 1975 was not signed 
by a single plastic artist. It was only on 21 January 1976 that E. Lipski sent to the marshal of the 
Sejm a supplementary list of people, which included B. Zbrożyna, H. Błachnio and H. Rudzka-
Cybisowa. The so-called Letter of 14 of 21 January 1976 was not signed by a single plastic art-
ist. The so-called Letter of 101 sent to the Sejm on 31 January 1976 by J. Andrzejewski with 
a protest against the limitations to freedom of speech planned in the Constitution was signed by 
J. Sempoliński and again by H. Błachnio and B. Zbrożyna; the letter’s signatories who belonged 
to the plastic arts community also included m. and J. Boguckis. In the letter with the protest 
against the changes to the Constitution of the PRL signed by 25 intellectuals, and sent in January 
to the Sejm’s Constitutional Commission, plastic artists were represented by K. maślanka-Braun 
and B. Pniewska-Krasińska (non-dated letter). The contents and signatories of the letters: Kultura 
1976, issue 1–2, and 1976, issue 3.
more on the strategy of the authorities of the PRL in relation to the community of plastic artists, and 
the conformity of the latter, vide e.g.: P. Piotrowski, Dekada: o syndromie lat siedemdziesiątych, 
kulturze artystycznej, krytyce, sztuce – wybiórczo i subiektywnie, Obserwator, Poznan 1991; idem, 
Awangarda w cieniu Jałty. Sztuka w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w latach 1945–1989, Dom 
Wydawniczy Rebis, Poznan 2005, pp. 309–315.
 23 M. Foucault, Nadzorować i karać. Narodziny więzienia, Aletheia, Warsaw 2009, pp. 196–198.
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operation with them, which was amplified by the widely promoted system of re-
wards, the system of repression lurking in the background, and (only as the final 
stage) verification of the results. The aim was to feed society with manipulated 
material in order to shape its awareness according to the regime’s needs. Due to 
those activities, certain aspects of life became unimaginable, thus they could not 
become the object of reflection and desire. Also the conformity of culture outlets 
was meant to eventually evolve towards complete internalisation of the solely just 
ideology, and desired attitudes.
Despite formal guarantees of freedom of expression, and a formal ban on 
the existence of institutional preventive censorship, democratic states feature an 
on-going struggle for the symbolic rule and, in turn, the exclusion of various 
ideologies, world-views, levels of knowledge, and messages from the sphere of 
discourse. Of course, that also has applied to Poland since 1989. Even the liberal 
rhetoric regarding the termination of censorship, so dominant in the Third Polish 
Republic, or the placement of censorship only within legal bans of the subse-
quent nature can support the thesis because that voids the informal non-obvious 
mechanisms which form the sphere of discourse. For many years Polish humanist 
studies lacked critical studies of censorship, i.e. going beyond the concept which 
stated that its source lay in some seat of power, which on an exception basis ex-
ecuted case-based interventions within the continuum of the free public sphere. 
The basis for a re-assessment of traditional assumptions as being too narrow, and 
basically obscuring the core of the problem was offered by the theories by Pierre 
Bourdieu and Michel Foucault. Both French scholars radically reformulated the 
notion of power, which also resulted in a radical change in the understanding of 
censorship.24 Thus, researchers stressed that censorship is not actually reflected in 
the control or bans originating from a state institution but, first of all, it is a result 
of dispersed relations of non-personal power within a society; secondly, just like 
that power, it operates overtly and covertly yet continuously, and emerges from 
everywhere, and, thirdly, it not as much bans as produces reality, the Truth and 
the Subject.25 Based on such assumptions the term censorship becomes current 
 24 Vide, e.g. P. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, Harvard University Press, Cambrid-
ge – mass. 1992; idem, H. Haacke, Free Exchange, Polity Press, Cambridge 1995; P. Bourdieu, 
O telewizji. Panowanie dziennikarstwa, trans. K. Sztandar-Sztanderska, A. Ziołkowska, Wydaw-
nictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2009; m. Foucault, Nadzorować…; idem, Historia seksualności, 
vol. 1 Wola wiedzy, trans. B. Banasiak, T. Komendant, K. matuszewski, słowo/obraz terytoria, 
Gdansk 2010.
 25 more on the subject, vide e.g.: R. Burt, “Introduction. The ‘New” Censorship’, in: Adminis-
tration of Aesthetics, R. Burt (ed.), University of minnesota Press, minneapolis – London 1994; 
R.C. Post, “Censorship and Silencing”, in: Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regu-
lation, R.C. Post (ed.), The Getty Research Institute for the History of Art and Humanities, Los 
Angeles 1998; m. Holquist, “Corrupt Originals: The Paradox of Censorship, “PmLA”, 109:1 (1994); 
J. Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, Routledge, New York – London 1997.
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also in relation to the less formalised mechanisms of shaping the sphere of dis-
course within systems of liberal democracy.
Since 1989, within the areas of culture and art alone one could indicate hun-
dreds of examples of censorship or attempted censorship.26 Their analysis indi-
cates that even though institutional control over the sphere of discourse was lifted 
in 1990, many informal relations of power (influencing what we think, say, create, 
and view) have remained. One of the lead examples is the age-old dominance of 
the Catholic world-view, and the resulting understanding of social relations (the 
roles of women and marriage, same-sex relationships, sexual education, abortion, 
contraception, protection of religious feelings, the secular nature of the state, the 
notions of morality, normality, freedom, or even the notion of art)27, though, evi-
dently, there has existed a gradual reconfiguring of the gagging relations of power 
(e.g. the introduction into public debate of feminist and gay emancipation stipula-
tions, or the progressing secularisation of the society – phenomena which dur-
ing the PRL seemed suspended). One could also discuss continuity in regard to 
certain specific mechanisms shaping the discourse; evolution only applies to their 
intensity, and the related rhetoric. The process of delegating censorship duties, 
and the principle of “good censorship is one which cannot be seen/is no longer 
necessary” remain valid. In their application, there are still used such stimuli as 
sanctions and rewards of various provenances, though usually of an economic 
nature.28 Let us examine the phenomena using examples.
In march 2015, Jacek Jaśkowiak, who had recently been elected president of 
Poznan as a candidate of Civic Platform, and who, prior to the election, appeared 
as an opponent of the conservative cultural policy of his predecessor Ryszard 
Grobelny, caused considerable confusion among his constituents. He stated that 
he sent a letter to Poznan’s archbishop Stanisław Gądecki to urge him to prevent 
the illegal placement of a Statue of Christ in Adam mickiewicz Square planned 
by the committee for the reconstruction of the Monument of Gratitude of the Sa-
cred Heart of Jesus Christ. He also made a similar request, i.e. to avoid any con-
troversial spectacles during the soon to come 1050th anniversary of the Baptism 
of Poland, with michał merczyński, the director of the malta Festival Poznan. 
“Let us refrain from doing something which is only intended to cause a row,” con-
 26 Vide “Spis wypadków cenzorskich 1989–2010” in: J. Dąbrowski, Cenzura…, pp. 690–736.
 27 Out of over 250 recorded interventions in freedom of art within the period 1989–2010, 35% 
were justified with religious reasons, and 45% with moral reasons, the majority of which referred 
to Catholic morality as their point of reference: J. Dąbrowski and A. Demenko, Cenzura w sztuce 
polskiej. Aspekty prawne, vol. 2, Fundacja Kultura miejsca, Warsaw 2014, p. 34.
 28 As noted by Svetlana mintcheva, a researcher of the issue of censorship in democratic sys-
tems: The ultimate dream of censorship is to do away with the censor, vide “The Censor within”, 
in: Censoring Culture. Contemporary Threats to Free Expression, R. Atkins, S. mintcheva (eds.), 
The New Press, New York 2006, p. 299.
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cluded Jaśkowiak.29 In his statement, Jaśkowiak referred, on the one hand, to the 
conflict regarding the monument of Gratitude of the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ, 
which, according to some, should be restored in its original form and placed in 
Adam mickiewicz square it having been demolished in 1939 by the Nazis30, and, 
on the other, to the spectacle entitled Golgota Picnic from June 2014, which was 
cancelled by director merczyński pressured by conservative politicians, associa-
tions, and the football fans of Lech Poznan.31
Formally speaking, Jaśkowiak’s statement lacks any threat of censorship, or 
of sanctions; it only includes a conciliatory (seemingly) symmetrically distrib-
uted appeal to the representatives of both ideological sides to refrain from pro-
voking any social conflicts. Yet the resulting situation raises the question: how 
Jaśkowiak’s suggestion was supposed to be interpreted by the director of malta 
Festival Poznan when 50% of its budget (nearly 3 million PLN) came from local 
government funding. In reality, the inclusion of spectacles which would contra-
dict the president’s intentions could result in the termination of the acclaimed 
event, while a cut in funding would be viewed by society as even more justified 
since the artists had been warned against “causing a row” (the number of infor-
mal sanctions on the part of the city’s authorities could be much higher because 
without the authorities’ good will the organisation of such a big festival is vir-
tually impossible). In order to mitigate possible horizontal disputes, Jaśkowiak 
shifted the problem vertically one level upwards – (through the wallets) to the 
minds of the festival’s organisers and artists. In doing so, the authorities not so 
much intended to block the propagation of undesired content as to induce a self-
gagging blockage of ideas, and any plans for propagating those (thus, there ex-
isted a type of delegation of censorship duties). Furthermore, bear in mind that 
even if the organisers of the festival and artists had acted against the will of the 
president, there would still have come the penal code to the rescue, Art. 196 of 
k.k. in particular, which criminalises instances of offending religious feelings. 
Regardless of the outcome of a resulting case, the fact of becoming a suspect or 
even a defendant is a considerable inconvenience, which could be considered as 
a sanction.
A somewhat different strategy of delegating censorship duties was applied 
by Piotr Gliński, the minister of Culture and National Heritage in the govern-
ment of the Law and Justice party, when through his subordinate officer from the 
Financial Department of the ministry he wrote a letter to the marshal of Lower 
Silesia Province regarding a morally controversial spectacle entitled “Smierć 
 29 T. Cylka, S. Lipoński, “Jaśkowiak chce spokoju w 2016 r.”, Gazeta Wyborcza Poznan, 
21.03.2015.
 30 Vide http://www.pomnikwdziecznosci.pl/ (accessed: 20.03.2017).
 31 more on the subject, vide Piknik Golgota Polska. Sztuka – religia – demokracja, A. Adamie-
cka-Sitek, I. Kurz (eds.), Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, Warsaw 2015.
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i dziewczyna.” The play, based on Elfriede Jelinek’s texts, was to be staged by 
Polski Theatre in Wroclaw. The final section of the letter dated 20 November 
2015 ran as follows:
mKiDN [ministry of Culture and National Heritage] does not intend to intervene in 
freedom of artistic expression. Nor does it intend to pursue the introduction of any 
forms of censorship. However, the activities of an institution which receives public, 
including central government, funding, cannot violate norms commonly applicable 
within our society. […] Therefore, the minister of Culture and National Heritage 
expects mr. marshal to immediately order the suspension of the preparations for the 
première in the announced form which violates the generally accepted principles of 
social relations.32
In fact, the letter included an assurance that there is no such thing as censorship, 
which was followed by strict conditions. The officer clearly stated: “the theatre can-
not”, “the minister expects the marshal to immediately order the suspension.” None-
theless, the minister appears in it as a tolerant person by stressing twice that “the issue 
applies to an institution which receives public funding”, which enables an a contrario 
conclusion that the violation of “generally accepted principles of social relations” in 
art cannot occur when funded with tax money, but it can occur when funded from pri-
vate sources. Since the introduction in Poland of a neo-liberal economic system ar-
gumenta ad “taxum” in disputes regarding art have appeared frequently, and there are 
specific reasons for that. The hypostatic figure of an ordinary taxpayer who is forced 
to pay for obscene/blasphemous/offensive art, first of all, suggests that there exists 
a universal model of social taste which defines what can be and what is not befitting 
to be financed through public funding. Secondly, that relates an emotional usually 
religion-based attack to the rational sphere of financial choices, which also helps gain 
the support of non-believers who do not care much about art or who are attached to 
its traditional paradigms. Considering the complexity of many contemporary works 
of art, and the poor education in terms of reading it prevalent in Poland, highlighting 
economic considerations is an efficient method of ousting controversial works from 
the public sphere. And thirdly, due to the economic argument, a censor stops being 
a censor (stops being visible). That is because she/he dissolves within the abstract 
mass of taxpayers, and just as abstract a notion of common good, and because her/
his argument, in terms of its message, is permissive (“one can exhibit the works by 
Garcia, Jelinek, Nieznalska, etc.”) – the problem, of course, lies in its conditional 
nature (“but not using my tax money”). Based on previous experience it seems clear 
 32 W. mrozek, “Jak zabić świetny teatr”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 24.08.2016. Polish Theatre in Wroc-
law is financed through subject and purpose subsidies from the central budget, and the budgets of 
local government entities. Its financial reports are approved by the management of Lower Silesia 
Province.
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that private sponsors indicated as alternative sources of financing are unwilling to 
support controversial, transgressive, and avant-garde (i.e. non-canonised within the 
process of state education) art projects as usually they possess a niche nature, which 
means that in terms of marketing they do not guarantee a return on investment. If 
they, however, exceed the small circle of viewers, that is usually due to a media scan-
dal, which can negatively influence the image of the sponsor (which is also measured 
based on specific market value). As noted by Naomi Klein, the image-based poli-
cies of corporations possess officially strong legalistic and pro-family nature, which 
means that potential private sponsors will rather dissociate themselves from works 
of art which violate “norms commonly applicable within our society.”33 The oppo-
nents of transgressive art are perfectly aware of the fact that in reality creators have 
very few options, and without state patronage they will not cope – that is a typical 
example of delegating censorship duties which consists of making people associated 
with culture choose: either to act in line with the expectations of the authorities, or 
withdraw from their preferred artistic activities. Officially, there is no censor there, 
and yet one knows that some areas of art will become severely limited or will cease 
to exist altogether as a result of self-censorship, i.e. that form of censorship which is 
the most difficult to objectify, and the most treacherous.
After 1989 one could indicate many similar examples of delegating censor-
ship duties; some mechanisms of limiting freedom of expression correspond to 
those which had been present in the communist regime. Though there is no final 
supervisor in the form of GUKPPiW, the system still works so that inconven-
ient expressions are excluded permanently. Not legal sanctions but a meditated 
distribution of economic and symbolic privileges (positions, subsidies, grants, 
assignments, publishing or staging options, etc.) is the most efficient method; thus 
desired behaviour is rewarded, and undesired behaviour is condemned, while the 
receivers themselves decide what is more beneficial to them.34 Bear in mind that 
what has also remained is the dispersed relations of power which for generations 
have shaped the minds and attitudes of Poles. I believe that the analysis of the is-
sues related to censorship before and after 6 June 1990 (or, more broadly, before 
 33 Strategies of corporate sales, vide N. Klein, No Logo, trans. m. Halaba, H. Jankowska, 
K. makaruk, Wydawnictwo mUZA S.A., Izabelin 2004, pp. 90–95, 183–186, 202–205. Private 
sponsors can easily turn from benefactors to enemies (that applied in the case of the legal black-
mail used in 1997 by Lego towards Zbigniew Libera and his work Lego. Concentration Camp); 
they can terminate the cooperation (as was done in 2003 by AmS and Cityboard media in relation 
to the project entitled Niech nas zobaczą by Karolina Breguła), or censor a work (as was done by 
AmS with Katarzyna Kozyra’s project entitled Więzy krwi).
 34 E.g. after charges were pressed against Dorota Nieznalska in 2002 for offending religious 
feelings of others with her installation entitled Pasja, for several years the artist was not offered 
a single exhibition in any valued Polish exhibition centre. Institutions, fearing repercussions on the 
part of politicians, were afraid to cooperate with her.
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and after 1989), not within the categories of a termination but as a kind of a con-
tinuum, could help better understand the nuances of the functioning of the sphere 
of discourse in the PRL. At the same time that approach enables one to diagnose 
in a more nuanced and critical manner the issue of freedom of expression in to-
day’s Poland.
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Jakub Dąbrowski
A few remarks on the mechanisms of censorship in the PRL35  
and the Third Republic of Poland
(Summary)
The purpose of the paper is to discuss the mechanism of censorship before and after 1990 
when the mission of the communist Chief Control Bureau for Press, Publications and Performanc-
es (GUKPPiW) was terminated. Communist censorship was not, as we have grown to perceive 
it, a case-based preventive control of the flow of ideas but a complex and continuous system of 
relations which shaped desired social actions. Institutional censorship only ensured the coherence 
of messages produced by self-censoring culture outlets: representatives of the media, scholars, 
writers, and artists. In my opinion the abolition of GUKPPiW was not some radical rupture, it 
seems that some of the mechanisms of censorship have a rather permanent nature, regardless of the 
political system. moreover, even though institutional control over the discursive sphere was lifted, 
many informal relations of power have remained untouched. These dispersed power relations have 
been shaping Polish society’s view of the world for centuries deciding what is good or bad, nice or 
ugly, decent or indecent, Polish or non-Polish, and last but not least – expressible or inexpressible.
Keywords: censorship in communist countries, censorship in democratic states, freedom of 
expression
 35 Commonly used abbreviation of the People’s Republic of Poland.
